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sianization is also promoted in kindergartens and mixed schools with parallel classes in Russian and Latvian where children are encouraged to befriend each other in the Russian tongue.

However, asserts the author, Latvian resistance to Moscow's pressure for Russification is equally strong, the young generation not excluded. In institutions of higher education Latvian students still hold a majority of 64.4%, despite favorite treatment bestowed by the regime on Russians. Dr. Kalnins concludes that the next two decades (provided Soviet Russian domination will last that long) will show whether the Latvian people will be able to maintain their slim majority on their ancient native soil. However, regardless of what the future holds in store, no mass conversion of the Latvian nation to Soviet Russian belief will ever occur, as long as a breath of national spirit prevails. The Red Muscovites of today will hardly succeed where their equally reactionary Czarist predecessors failed: namely, to bend the subjected nations of Holy Russia under the reign of one ruler, one creed, and one people.

Mr. Speaker, as I have indicated to the Members, I will continue to emphasize the cause of Latvia and other victims of communism, since the foreign policy of the United States remains dedicated to legitimate self-determination of peoples. We will not give legal sanction to Soviet colonial rule of Latvia and its neighbor states of Lithuania and Estonia.

#### THE STATE DEPARTMENT—SOME ABUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Mr. ASHBROOK (at the request of Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, in his recently published book, "Memoirs, 1925-1950," George F. Kennan, whose credentials in the academic, the foreign affairs, and the liberal community can hardly be questioned, and whose present view toward the U.S.S.R. hews to the "mellowing" line, refers to the purge in mid-1937 in which the realistic "hardliners" in the State Department's Russian division were shunted aside by pro-Soviet replacements:

For here, if ever, was a point at which there was indeed the smell of Soviet influence, or strongly pro-Soviet influences somewhere in the higher reaches of the government.

In view of the nature of the following remarks this illustration is not meant to infer that the same conditions obtain at State today, but merely serves to indicate that cliques and coteries are nothing new in that Department. However, considering the revelations of the past month or so concerning the Runge and the Philby-Burgess-Maclean spy cases, lax security practices in an agency as sensitive as State warrant review and corrective action. Because some of the outrageous abuses that have been perpetrated at State over the last few years have not received adequate attention or publicity, I think it is advisable to comment on the situation and offer possible recommendations. The unparalleled successes of Soviet espionage over the years should have resulted in a highly refined security system at State, but recent experiences in-

dicate that coverups of security violations and purges of qualified security personnel have provided a possible fertile field for Communist penetration. A brief review of the Philby-Burgess-Maclean case will provide a background against which our own security problems at State should be evaluated.

#### PHILBY, BURGESS, AND MACLEAN

The vital need for unbreachable security procedures has been pointed up during the past two decades by many cases of defections, disappearances, suicides, arrests, scandals and the like, but nowhere, not even in the phenomenal Richard Sorge case, have there been situations to rival those of Harold (Kim) Philby, Guy Burgess, and Don Maclean.

These three men managed to accumulate well over 50 years of communism and aim their spying efforts at the heart of both British and American security. All three were members of the British Foreign Service and all three managed to defect to the Soviet Union, the land of their allegiance.

Donald D. Maclean first entered the British Foreign Service in 1935, shortly after he left Trinity College, Cambridge, where he had a "distinguished academic record." He was stationed in Cairo. Guy F. Burgess entered the Foreign Service as a temporary employee in 1947. His record at Trinity College was described as "brilliant."

For years the damage done by these men has been either hushed or minimized and their backgrounds said to be clear of Communist leanings, at least in the eyes of the security office responsible for their activities.

To the Communists, however, they were picked up early, doubtless well indoctrinated, and used to their fullest extent. While British security did not know of the Communist sympathies of Burgess and Maclean, the Communists latched on to them at Cambridge.

Vladimir M. Petrov, a Soviet MVD agent in Australia who defected to the west on April 3, 1954, clarified the backgrounds and activities of the two spies in these excerpted statements of sworn testimony:

Burgess and Maclean were long term agents who had each been independently recruited to work for Soviet intelligence in their student days at Cambridge University. Their flight was planned and directed from Moscow.

(During a period in London after the War) Burgess was bringing out brief cases full of Foreign Office documents, which were photographed in the Soviet Embassy and quickly returned to him.

Petrov stated that he received this information directly from an assistant in the Embassy, Filipp Kisiltsyn, who was involved with receiving the stolen documents. In fact, Kisiltsyn was an MVD cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy in London and, Petrov stated:

Kisiltsyn used to encipher the more urgent information and cable it to Moscow; the rest he prepared for despatch by courier in the diplomatic bag.

This same Kisiltsyn was later recalled to Moscow and trained to handle a special one-man section of the top-secret archives.

Petrov continues:

This section was devoted solely to the great quantity of material supplied by Maclean and Burgess. Much of it had not even been translated or distributed to the Ministries concerned, but Kisiltsyn used to show particular files and documents to high-ranking officials who visited his section for the purpose.

This testimony reveals the vast amount of information which the informers passed on. The next question is, of course, What information was involved and what damage did it do?

The cost of the security breaches through which Burgess and Maclean moved is indicated not only by their positions in the respective senior and junior service corps, but by their connections with another British traitor, Harold Philby.

"Kim" Philby's exploits over 30 years as a Soviet agent can be compared only with the celebrated Japan-based spy, Richard Sorge. Philby came to Washington as temporary first secretary a few months before Burgess, an old friend—all three were acquainted from Cambridge. From this vantage point he became the third man in the defection plot. Philby, too, had been thoroughly immersed in communism during his Cambridge days, and like the other two, it took. After leaving Cambridge he took years fashioning an elaborate coverup of his leanings toward communism which included pro-Nazi associations and journalistic service in Franco's Spain. He was so successful that Franco gave him a state decoration which he was known to display.

Philby managed to gain access to British security—the lifetime task given him by the Communists—in the summer of 1941 and was assigned to head up counterespionage in the Iberian section. Philby later became the link between British Secret Intelligence Service and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

It was in this position that Philby had access to a secret report from MI5—the counterespionage section—naming Maclean as the principal suspect in a 2-year-old security leak investigation. The logical chain then had Philby relating the secret information to Burgess and Burgess passing it on to Maclean.

Philby was asked to resign from the British Foreign Service in July of 1951 and the "third man" case, according to Prime Minister MacMillan some time later, was both denied and closed.

Thirteen years later Philby defected to the Soviet Union from his post as journalist in the Middle East with the Economist and the Observer, a position taken after the reported separation mentioned above. But it was at the time of the defection, and now generally believed as common knowledge, that Philby had still maintained working connections with British security and had never been taken off the payroll. This would extend his stint as a traitor to a full 30 years: 1933 to 1963, many of them in the Foreign Service.

I will make a more complete presentation of the backgrounds and associations of Philby, Burgess, and Maclean at a later date. At this point it is more important to examine the effects which lax

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or nonexistent, security had upon the history of the world.

There is little doubt that these men not only passed on to their Communist superiors a great quantity of information but information of great value. The full nature and impact of secret documents revealed to the Soviets will never be known even though hushed investigations still ferret out facets of the traitor's work. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that their actions ultimately involved not only Britain but the United States and directly or indirectly many American citizens.

## MAC ARTHUR AND KOREA

To the average American citizen concerned with the problems of everyday life, the subject of espionage is as far removed from his area of responsibilities as putting a man on the moon. To be sure, the CIA, the FBI, and other governmental agencies are directly concerned with problems of this nature, but in the long run John Doe can be severely affected by weak security procedures. The case of Gen. Douglas MacArthur and the Korean war is an excellent case in point.

It will be remembered that some months after the North Koreans had invaded South Korea in June 1950, the U.N. forces under MacArthur smashed the advance of the Communists with the brilliant Inchon maneuver. The invaders were chased back to the Yalu River in disarray and the end of the conflict was clearly in sight. Then the buildup of Chinese Communist troops north of the Yalu brought up the question of bombing the Yalu bridges if the Chinese Reds entered the fray. As history has recorded, MacArthur was denied by Washington the permission to bomb the Yalu bridges and the Chinese communication lines in Manchuria in case of necessity. General MacArthur in his book "Reminiscences" states on page 370:

For the first time in military history, a commander has been denied the use of his military power to safeguard the lives of his soldiers and safety of his army. To me it clearly foreshadows a future tragic situation in the Far East and leaves me with a sense of inexpressible shock. It will cost the lives of thousands of American soldiers and place in jeopardy the entire army. By some means the enemy commander must have known of this decision to protect his lines of communication into North Korea, or he never would have dared to cross those bridges in force.

Again on page 374 MacArthur referred to the apparent leak in intelligence:

That there was some leak in intelligence was evident to everyone. Walker continually complained to me that his operations were known to the enemy in advance through sources in Washington. I will always believe that if the United States had issued a warning to the effect that any entry of the Chinese Communists in force into Korea would be considered as an act of international war against the United States, that the Korean War would have terminated with our advance north. I feel that the Reds would have stayed on their side of the Yalu. Instead, information must have been relayed to them, assuring that the Yalu bridges would continue to enjoy sanctuary and that their bases would be left intact. They knew they could swarm down across the Yalu River without having to worry about bombers hitting their Manchurian supply lines.

On page 375 MacArthur quotes Chinese Communist Gen. Lin Piao as later stating in an official Chinese leaflet:

I would never have made the attack and risked my men and military reputation if I had not been assured that Washington would restrain General MacArthur from taking adequate retaliatory measures against my lines of supply and communication.

With recent disclosures in the British press there can remain little doubt as to who was responsible for the intelligence leak in Washington which so benefited the Chinese Reds. Philby arrived in Washington as British liaison to the FBI and CIA and in November 1950, Maclean came to Washington as head of the Foreign Office's American department. The Washington Post of October 16, 1967, excerpted material from the London Sunday Times relating to Maclean's role in the Korean affair. It stated:

The State Department has compiled an analysis of Maclean's role at the time which credits him with knowledge of the U.S.-Japanese treaty negotiations and the Korean War strategy.

The State Department accounts says that Maclean was aware of the critical American decision to "localize" the Korean conflict.

Instead of the Korean war ending up as a short and ill-advised fiasco for the Reds, it turned into a long-drawn-out stalemate so costly in American lives. Because of the invaluable information relayed to the Chinese Reds, the Korean war was extended to July of 1953 when the armistice was signed. American losses over the 3-year period amounted to 33,629 battle deaths, 20,617 other deaths, 103,284 nonmortal wounds suffered for a total of 157,530 American casualties. The Korean war is an excellent case in point, as I have stated, of the enormous penalties exacted because of weak and inadequate security procedures when dealing with a clever international adversary, the Communist conspiracy.

## OTHER SUCCESSES

Although Korean war information is probably the most graphic of any involving these three Communist agents, Philby, Burgess and Maclean, they were also active in other vital areas.

In 1949, on the occasion of the first U.S.S.R. atomic bomb explosion, Philby and staff reportedly spent 4 days and nights coding and decoding messages between the United States and Britain.

Burgess, in 1946, served as assistant private secretary to an under secretary of the Foreign Secretary.

In contrast and not to be outdone, Maclean served as secretary of the United States-British Combined Policy Committee on Atomic Development. This position gave him nearly unlimited access to the tightly guarded Atomic Energy Commission files in Washington. This access, the London Sunday Times reported, "gave Maclean access to the greatest storehouse of atomic knowledge that there is." Maclean could have, and probably did, leak to the Russians the where and how much concerning Allied purchases of uranium. At this time the United States was engaged in preemptive purchase of uranium since it was thought the supply was limited. He also could have—he certainly had the ac-

cess—told the Communists that the United States had perfected a method of converting low-grade ore into high-grade, a fact of certain interest to Soviet scientists.

The same congressional committee which received the testimony of defector Petrov also reported what might be a totally unpublicized area of Donald Maclean.

The committee reported that it heard in closed session a number of Americans who testified to the activities of Burgess and Maclean. These hearings were "designed to determine the possible involvement of our people here":

[The investigators have] the identity of a long series of individuals who were intimates of the pair here. In this connection, we obtained the desk pad of Alger Hiss which revealed that Hiss had had a date at the British Embassy with Maclean on September 14, 1946.

Should evidence of continued association, direct or indirect, between Hiss and Maclean be found, it would greatly broaden the area to which Maclean had access and also provide multiple channels for passing on information.

It is absurd that security procedures should allow three Communists to function year after year after year, especially when one considers that their university days would certainly make them more suspect than had they not been Communist oriented. But, even being generous and granting that this would have been difficult to trace, security violations of other types should have forced their removal from any position in the Government.

Astoundingly, British security kept no tabs on possible homosexuals, although sexual deviates are prime targets for blackmail. If British security had been concerned with this area, Burgess and Maclean might have been routed from service earlier.

Early in 1950 security authorities informed the Foreign Office that in late 1949 while on a vacation abroad, Burgess had been guilty of "indiscreet talk" about secret matters which he knew. Action against this breach consisted only of a reprimand, and evidently security officers did not followup to determine whether this was an isolated incident.

In addition, both Maclean and Burgess had drinking problems and Burgess ran amuck of the police in Virginia three times in 1 day for traffic offenses. The third time the Burgess car was involved in an accident, police found out the man driving had been picked up along the road, had no license, and was a homosexual with a police record.

Assuming that security missed the fact that Philby became a solid Communist during his Cambridge days, investigation and disclosure of the activities of Burgess would have exposed Philby also, since Burgess lived in the Washington home of Philby from August 1950 to April 1951.

Former CIA Chief Allen Dulles summed up the security violations in these words:

Neither a Burgess nor a Maclean should ever have been allowed to have anything to do with classified matters. Even a reasonably casual review of their activities during the